If one takes the physicalist perspective — everything that exists is ultimately physical — then determinism seems a lot more plausible. Previously in Determinism and Free Will, I was dealing with the classic definitions of free will and determinism. These conceptions assume a distinction between the two, placing them in opposition to one another. The plausibility of determinism increases significantly from the viewpoint of the physicalist because free will can exist inside determinism (and thus is not opposed to it) — a compatibilist theory.
This is an intriguing thought and one I’ve entertained a lot recently. If everything in the universe is physical at its very roots — galaxies, stars, planets, trees, animals, thoughts, feelings, ideas, reactions, etc. — then it seems entirely reasonable, even necessary, that everything be deterministic. If the thoughts flowing through my head right now are just a series of complex chemical and electric reactions in my brain, then the fact that they exist depends on the immediate previous state of my brain. This notion of a given state of affairs at time t2 being dependent on another state of affairs at time t1 (earlier) gives rise to a new and more specific definition of determinism. This is a view that Hume expressed long ago.
Some call this “soft determinism” compared with the traditional definition of the word. It’s not hard to see why this conception entails determinism once one understands that every single state of affairs that occurs is necessarily dependent on the state of affairs immediately preceeding it. By “state of affairs” I mean a certain configuration of the physical matter in the universe. If everything is physical then this state of affairs also represents the thoughts of every sentient being, accounting for everything that is traditionally problematic when defining determinism. We can say that it is not a choice you make to eat ice cream, but rather that the states of affairs that lead up to you eating ice cream each follow from the immediately previous state and thus are all causally deterministic.
Intriguing yes, but I’m not ready to commit to this concept entirely. I have to mull over some of the more interesting corner cases and iron out the details first. In any case, it makes much more sense than elephants, tortoises, or floating men.
Be sure to keep us up to date when you finally decide to commit to a wrong theory!
Compatibilists live with contradiction - determinism prevails and doesn’t prevail.
The compatibilist invariably moves from deterministic description to ascription (of responsibility, blame, praise, guilt, obligation, rights etc.) as the occasion suits.
An addition to keep the thread alive.
The progression from description to ascription is, of course, a progression from sentences which are either true or false (descriptions) to sentences which are neither true nor false (ascriptions).
That is, from physics to ethics or fact to fiction.
Some compatibilists may trade between descriptions and ascriptions, but that’s not a necessary part of the theory. Hume elaborates on this and essentially notes that one simply has to redefine “freedom” as something that is compatible with determinism.
The new definition may seem technically non-traditional, but it can still fit the overall traditional idea.
How can determinism affect crime and punishment?
“You were bound to commit the crime by a prior state of the Universe.
Now, you’ve created a state where I have to punish you,
that I might create a state in which you’d be deterred from offending again!”
It doesn’t sound so crazy to me ;)